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 ABSTRACT    
 
This paper aims to put forward some policy suggestions regarding the goal and strategies of the 
regional development policy in Korea. We first survey past regional policies and examine the 
regional disparity in Korea. It is found using the OECD data that although population and income are 
highly concentrated, inequalities of income and other living standards do not seem as problematic as 
to call for strong government intervention. Moreover, recent development in the new economic 
geography implies that the ‘capital vs. non-capital area’ framework that has been shaping the Korean 
regional development policy should be reconsidered. The main message of this paper is that it is not 
desirable for the central government to disperse agglomeration to enhance regional equity and that 
local governments should be responsible for regional development. Therefore enhancing the 
autonomy and accountability of the regional government is essential. 
 
 
 
 
본 연구는 지금까지의 우리나라의 지역
개발정책을 평가하고, 현황 파악과 이론적
검토를 통해 향후 지역개발정책의 목표와
전략에 대한 정책적 함의를 도출하는 것을
목적으로 한다. 우리나라의 지역정책은 일
관되게 지역 간 균형을 추구하는 측면이 강
했는데, 경제학적 관점에서 보았을 때 인위
적인 지역 간 격차 완화, 특히 수도권과 비
수도권 간 격차의 완화는 효율성뿐만 아니
라 공평성을 저해할 가능성이 있다. 또한
우리나라의 지역 간 격차를 파악하고
OECD 주요국들과 비교한 결과, 우리나라
의 인구 및 소득 집중도가 높은 것은 사실
이나 지역 간 소득수준이나 여타 생활여건
 
의 격차가 크다고 보기는 어려운 것으로 
나타난다. 따라서 향후 지역정책은 인위
적으로 경제활동을 재배치하여 지역 간 
균형을 추구하기보다는 각 지역의 자생적 
성장능력을 키워주는 데 주력할 필요가 
있다. 이를 위해서 지역개발에 대해 현재 
중앙정부가 가지고 있는 각종 권한을 대
폭 지방으로 이전하여 지방의 자율성을 
강화하는 한편, 지역의 성장은 궁극적으
로 지방정부가 책임지도록 책임성을 부과
할 필요가 있으며, 중앙정부는 지역발전
을 위한 정보와 인력을 제공하는 등 건설
적인 조력자로서의 역할을 담당해야 할 
것이다. 
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I . Introduction 
 
 
Since the 1970’s when Korea began to accelerate its unprecedented economic 
growth, regional development policies have been carried out in various forms and 
names. They reflected the development stage, socioeconomic environment and the 
priority set by the government of the time. On one hand, it is quite natural and to 
some extent desirable for regional policy to reflect such social, economic, and 
political factors. On the other hand, however, it is hard to deny that Korean regional 
development policy has been somewhat ad hoc; it has been set up and changed 
arbitrarily lacking established goal and consistent strategy. 
Most of all, the goal of regional policy itself has been vague. Should it be to 
disperse the concentration of population and economic activity in the capital area? 
Should it be to reduce the disparity across regions? What is the rationale for the goal, 
if any, of regional policy? No such fundamental questions have been seriously asked 
and answered. Also, discussion about how to attain such a goal has been scarce. 
Therefore, it is very important to establish the meaning and goal of regional policy 
and find an optimal strategy. This is the more important at this point in time when 
Korea is going through a downturn of economy coupled with worsened income 
distribution. 
One characteristic feature of Korean regional policy is that it virtually means 
balanced regional development policy. That is, regional development policy in Korea 
usually refers to a policy aimed at reducing inequality among regions. This seems to 
cause many confusions and inefficiency, and undermine the efficacy of policy. In 
particular, the framework of ‘capital vs. non-capital area’ seems to capture people’s 
recognition of regional policy. The typical argument from this perspective goes as 
follows. Most material and human resources, public institutions, top universities and 
big companies are concentrated in the Seoul National Capital Area (SNCA)1 and this 
impoverishes non-capital areas. Moreover, people in the SNCA also suffer from 
congestion. Therefore, government should control further expansion of the SNCA 
and instead relocate various facilities to non-capital areas. Although this argument 
may seem very persuasive, it does not survive a careful scrutiny. Detailed discussion 
will follow later, but a brief counterargument is as follows. According to the recent 
development in economics, agglomeration arises naturally as the economy develops 
and it is in itself not something to be fixed; it is only when agglomeration generates 
bad externalities or when regional disparity is very severe that the government 
needs to take action. Also, examining relevant data suggests that the current regional 
disparity in Korea is not as serious as to call for equalization across regions. 
Therefore, current policy focus on regional equity should be reconsidered. 
Incidentally, what is often ignored when regional development policy pursues 
regional equity is that balanced development is in general not compatible with 
growth or national competitiveness. Development in the research on spatial 
                                            
1This consists of Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi-province. 
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structure of economic activities such as the new economic geography and the recent 
experience in many countries together suggest that balanced regional development 
by means of relocating resources of the core area to peripheral areas is a policy 
objective that is not compatible with economic growth. Pursuing balanced regional 
development without understanding this point may result in an unintended policy 
outcome. 
Moreover, if the policy goal of balanced development policy is to improve 
income distribution across regions, not only it is an ineffective means but also it may 
actually worsen income distribution. In the discussion of inter-regional transfer, a 
region is usually treated as a unity. But in fact a region is a collection of many 
heterogeneous individuals and households, and a poor person may live in a wealthy 
region and vice versa. Therefore, transferring income from a rich region to a poor 
one may cause a poor person in a wealthy region to subsidize a rich person in a poor 
region. If the improvement of income distribution is the policy goal, the right target 
of income transfer should be individuals or households, not regions; balanced 
regional development policy is not a good tool to tackle income distribution. 
From this perspective, the goal and strategy of regional development policy in 
Korea should be redefined. Specifically, regional policy should be designed to induce 
autonomous regional growth so that each regional government is held responsible 
for its own growth. That is, regional governments should be endowed with both 
autonomy and accountability. The role of the central government should be limited 
to monitoring and coordinating regional projects. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly overviews 
the regional development polices in Korea. Section 3 examines the current status of 
regional disparity. Section 4 introduces the new economic geography and draws 
implications for Korean regional policy. Section 5 evaluates past policies and 
proposes a new policy goal and strategy. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
II. A Brief Overview of Korean Regional Development Policy 
 
 
In this section, we divide the economic development stage of Korea into three 
periods,2 and briefly overview the regional policy in each period focusing on the 
industry location policy, the SNCA regulation, and poor region support policy. 
Evaluating these policies and getting implications for future policy will be done in 
Section 5 after we examine the current regional disparity and overview related 
researches. 
 
 
 
                                            
2This is based on Choi et al. (2007), who divided the economic development stage into i) 1970~1980’s, ii) 
1990~foreign exchange crisis, and iii) post-crisis period according to economic growth, industrial stage, 
regional migration, regional income disparity and so on. Different view focusing on other aspects of 
development may exist. 
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1. 1970 ~ 1980’s: Industrialization, Growth and Population Concentration 
 
This period observed an unprecedented economic growth and a huge inflow of 
population into Seoul. Notwithstanding the crises due to the oil shocks and political 
turmoil, Korea accomplished a tremendous economic growth through 
industrialization and export in this period.3 
The characterizing feature of regional policy in this period is that it was used as 
an auxiliary tool for economic growth instead of having an independent role of its 
own. The policy that took the highest priority was industry location policy; the 
government determined industry location by efficiency standard. The Korean 
economy in the 1960’s was mostly light industry-centered but as the less developed 
countries began to catch up in the 1970’s, Korea began to lose its comparative 
advantage in light industry. In order to overcome such difficulties and advance the 
industry structure, the Korean government concentrated on fostering heavy industry 
such as steel, automobile, electronic, shipbuilding, and petrochemical industries. 
These industries were mostly located in Gyeongsang-province, the southeastern part 
of the Korean Peninsula, such as Changwon, Gumi, Pohang and Ulsan. This was 
mainly because these areas had a good access to the Pacific Ocean, but it is true that 
political factors also worked. 
At the same time, efforts were also made to induce manufacturing industry to 
locate in non-capital areas. Benefits and incentives were given to firms that moved 
out of the metropolitan area to mitigate the congestion in the SNCA. 
The policy direction that takes regional disparity into account was strengthened 
in the 1980’s. Under the recognition that the strategic concentration of industry on 
some key bases generated regional disparity and many other problems, the 
government sought to disperse small- and middle-sized industrial complexes all 
across the country. This was intended to serve various purposes such as facilitating 
regional growth, dispersing concentrated population, and fostering small and 
medium enterprises. Measures were also taken and laws enacted to create income 
basis for rural and less developed areas by attracting manufacturing and service 
industries to those areas. 
In the mean while, as the inflow of population into Seoul that had started in the 
1960’s accelerated in the 1970’s, concentration and congestion in the SNCA began to 
be recognized as an important social issue. The government enacted various laws 
and regulations to deter concentration and disperse industry. 
In the same vein, serious consideration was given to deal with underdeveloped 
poor regions. The Comprehensive National Development Plan in 1982 explicitly 
declared balanced regional development as one of the policy goals, and various 
projects were executed to sponsor rural and back regions and special regions such as 
small islands that lagged far behind. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
3The nominal per capita GDP jumped from US$254 in 1970 to US$5,418 in 1989. 
74    韓國開發硏究 / 2010. Ⅰ  
 
 
2. 1990 ~ Economic Crisis in 1997: Open Economy, Deindustrialization, 
and Regional Disparity 
 
In the worldwide tide of globalization and open market economy, Korea began to 
substantially open up the market by abolishing preferential tariffs and lowering 
import duties on many items. The need to enhance competitiveness led the 
government to boost up the independence and autonomy of the private sector. The 
favorable economic conditions in the late 1980’s such as low oil price, low interest 
rate, and weak US dollar, accelerated this trend. Domestic market expanded 
considerably in this period due to the economic boom and wage increase, and 
deindustrialization started as the share of the telecommunication, finance, and 
service industries increased. Regional disparity gradually increased in this period, 
which is ascribable to the development of transportation and communication and the 
expansion of knowledge-based economic activities. At the same time, however, the 
population concentration in the SNCA showed a slowdown; the population share of 
the SNCA increased from 42.1% in 1989 to only 45.7% in 1997. This was mainly 
because less people migrated to the SNCA. 
As for the industry location policy in this period, more stress was put on 
expanding the industrial base of the underdeveloped regions. As the disparity 
between the capital and non-capital areas and the gap between urban and rural areas 
deepened as a result of fast economic growth and became an important social issue, 
the third Comprehensive National Development Plan in 1992 put emphasis on 
building the basis for balanced regional development. The plan specifically 
promoted fostering the development of non-capital areas, controlling the expansion 
of the capital area, and constructing new industry areas in underdeveloped regions. 
The capital area regulation in this period continued to seek for mitigating the 
overcrowding of this area, and various measures were taken for this purpose in the 
form of regulating firm location or economic activities, setting a ceiling on the 
number of firms in an area, levying a congestion charge, and introducing differential 
tax, charge, and subsidy. 
Efforts were also made to improve the living standard of underdeveloped regions. 
Various plans and laws were promoted and enacted to develop poor coastal and 
island areas and interior back regions. New laws were also enacted to support small 
and medium enterprises in the non-capital areas. All these policies targeted on 
improving the living standard of the underdeveloped areas and supplying SOC. 
 
 
3. Post-Crisis Period: Knowledge-Based Economy and Aggressive 
Regional Policy 
 
The Korean economy went through a thorough restructuring in various aspects 
after the economic crisis in 1997 that left a deep scar on the overall society. The 
remarkable growth rate slowed down considerably and the share of the 
knowledge-based industry in the national economy rose substantially. The 
distribution of the knowledge-based industry shows a significant regional disparity; 
about 60% of the work force in the industry is located in the SNCA. In the process of 
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knowledge-based industrialization, R&D investment, which is essential to 
innovation capability, also increased substantially. The distribution of R&D 
investment also shows regional disparity. 
The number of people migrating into the SNCA, which slowed down in the 
1990’s, started to increase again from 1999, but this trend then reversed in 2003 and 
the inflow into the SNCA has been decreasing since then. However, the economic 
condition of the underdeveloped regions is still inferior in spite of various 
development plans and projects, and population is still decreasing there. 
Regional policy was driven forward aggressively in this period in the form of 
balanced regional development policy. The Kim Dae-jung administration that kicked 
off in 1998 right after the economic crisis placed strong emphasis on reducing the 
inter-class and inter-regional gap. It established the Balanced Regional Development 
Committee to design, coordinate, and promote various regional policies. Several 
government offices and institutions such as the Office of Supply, Custom Service and 
the National Statistical Office were relocated to Daejeon which is about 140km south 
of Seoul. Promotion of regional industry to build up basis for regional development 
continued to be carried out. Regulations on the SNCA also continued, but in the 
process of restructuring after the crisis some exceptions were also made such as 
relaxing location regulation to induce foreign investment or loosening greenbelt 
regulation. In the reconciliatory mood of the Korean peninsula, development projects 
were also driven forward for the borderland near the DMZ. 
Regional policy underwent an epochal change as Roh Moo-hyun administration 
took off in 2003. Setting balanced development as one of the national agendas of the 
highest priority and elevating the status of balanced regional development policy to 
‘Balanced National Development Policy (BNDP),’ the Roh administration put a 
strong drive on balanced regional development. Various institutional apparatuses 
such as Balanced National Development Plan, Special Law for Balanced National 
Development and Special Accounting for Balanced National Development were 
made to support the policy systematically. The Second Stage Plan for Balanced 
National Development announced in 2007 introduced various measures to support 
non-capital areas such as reducing corporate tax for the firms relocating to 
non-capital areas, reducing the medical care contribution share of the employers in 
underdeveloped regions, and subsidizing universities in non-capital areas. 
The three principle of BNDP is as follows. The first principle is a ‘comprehensive 
approach,’ which means that the plan seeks for balanced development not by 
fragmented support but by comprehensive means such as decentralization and 
constructing a new administrative city. The second one is the ‘construction of 
regional innovation system,’ which means that departing from the traditional 
input-driven growth, the new system aims at autonomous localization by building 
up regional innovation system and transform the regional economy into an 
innovation-driven one. The third one is ‘developing non-capital regions first and 
then managing the SNCA systematically,’ which is intended to develop both the 
capital and non-capital areas. 
The projects of BNDP can be classified into three categories. The first is to relocate 
government ministries and agencies out of Seoul by constructing the administrative 
city, ‘innovation city,’ and ‘enterprise city.’ The second is to foster regional 
76    韓國開發硏究 / 2010. Ⅰ  
 
 
innovation by promoting regional industry, strengthening the ties between industry 
and academia, fostering the innovation capability of local universities, building 
regional industrial clusters, and so on. The third is to support underdeveloped 
regions through promoting regional industry and designating districts for 
specialized development. 
BNDP is also distinguished from the past policies in many respects. Past regional 
policies were usually planned and executed by ministries and offices in the central 
government without proper coordination, which caused lack of consistency and 
inefficiency due to overlapping investment. To fix these problems, the Roh 
administration changed the execution system completely so that each regional policy 
can be planned and enforced for each region. That is, each region became the unit of 
planning and execution of regional policy. Also, the Presidential Committee on 
Balanced National Development was founded as a control tower, and Special 
Accounting for Balanced National Development was established to manage balanced 
development policy independently and systematically. 
 
 
III. Regional Disparity in Korea 
 
 
1. Regional Disparity in Korea 
 
Ever since the overpopulation and agglomeration of the capital area became an 
important social issue, there have been many studies on regional disparity in many 
respects. (E.g. Hwang [1982], Huh [1989], Kim et al [1991], Byun [1999], Kim [2003], 
Moon [2003], Choi et al. [2007]) In spite of the different approach and methodology 
adopted, theses studies show similar results on the time trend of regional disparity. 
Meanwhile, what is often stressed and talked of in the discussion of regional 
disparity in Korea is the gap between the capital and non-capital areas. Although the 
gap between the two is recognized as a malignant phenomenon, systematic studies 
on this issue seem rare. In this subsection, we will first examine the regional 
disparity in Korea, and then critically evaluate the argument that stresses the gap 
between the capital and non-capital areas. 
Most studies on regional disparity use regional Gini index or coefficient of 
variation of per capita GRDP to measure regional disparity. According to the 
analyses, regional disparity in Korea was decreasing from 1970 until the mid 1990’s, 
but then the trend reversed and has been increasing ever since. See <Table 1>. 
Regional disparity is getting bigger especially after the economic crisis in 1997 and 
this seems to be related to the knowledge-based industrialization which is occurring 
geographically unevenly. 
Meanwhile, Moon (2003) examines the regional disparity in other countries and 
finds that regional disparity in Korea is close to those in developed countries. 
According to this study, disparity in Korea is actually smaller than some other 
centralized countries such as France and Italy. This shows that although regional 
disparity in Korea has been worsening recently, it is not that high in the international 
standard. This study also shows that the disparity measured by consumption 
 Reconsidering the Goal and Strategy of Regional Development Policy in Korea   77 
 
<Table 1> Regional Disparity in Korea (1970~2005) 
 
 Gini Coefficient Coefficient of Variation 
1970 0.1147 0.2228 
1975 0.0917 0.1708 
1980 0.1097 0.2197 
1985 0.0843 0.1670 
1990 0.0734 0.1442 
1995 0.0582 0.1119 
2000 0.0877 0.1626 
2005 0.0910 0.1686 
Source: Choi et al. (2007). 
 
 
<Table 2> Regional Disparity in Korea: Income vs. Consumption 
 
 
Regional Income Per Capita Regional Consumption Per Capita 
Gini CV Gini CV 
1995 0.0988 0.1875 0.0427 0.0897 
1996 0.1070 0.1993 0.0462 0.1008 
1997 0.1163 0.2152 0.0459 0.1000 
1998 0.1254 0.2320 0.0424 0.0933 
1999 0.1306 0.2406 0.0411 0.0876 
2000 0.1363 0.2507 0.0379 0.0740 
2001 0.1379 0.2543 0.0369 0.0756 
Source: Moon (2003). 
 
 
expenditure, which may represent the economic power of a region better than GRDP, 
is significantly smaller than that measured by GRDP. Moreover, in contrast to the 
movement of the disparity measured by GRDP, the disparity measured by 
consumption expenditure is improving. See <Table-2>. This suggests that the degree 
of regional disparity in Korea may not be as serious as it looks. 
Now let’s consider the argument that highlights the gap between the capital and 
non-capital areas, which occupies an important place in the discussion of regional 
disparity. The argument that emphasizes the gap between the two is as follows. The 
SNCA is holding too much of everything for its relative size, such as population, 
firms, public offices and institutions, universities, financial institutions, and so on. 
More specifically, the SNCA, which accounts for only 11.8% of Korean territory, 
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holds about 50% of total population, employees, hospitals, and economic power, 
about 70% of total financial transactions and about 85% of government offices and 
public institutions. Hence, the SNCA suffers from congestion and inefficiency and at 
the same time other regions are impoverished. Moreover, the argument goes, such 
concentration is hard to be found in other countries; the population share of the 
capital area is 47.6% in Korea, 32.6% in Japan, 18.7% in France, and 12.2% in the UK. 
Such arguments that regard the concentration of population and resources in the 
SNCA as the main source of regional disparity have been widely accepted and have 
had big influence on various regional policies. However, this argument seems faulty 
in many respects and policies based on it may be problematic. We will examine this 
argument closely below. 
Let’s first think about the concentration of population and economic power in the 
SNCA. It is true that the SNCA holds a lot for its area share, but in fact the same 
phenomenon is true of all the other big cities in Korea. <Table 3> shows the share of 
area, population, and income of major cities in Korea with respect to the surrounding 
regions. It turns out that the high proportion of core city is a nationwide 
phenomenon; the core city of a region has a very high share of population and 
income. <Table 4>, which shows the ratio of population and income share to the area 
share for each region, indicates that concentration index measured this way is 
actually lower for the SNCA than for most of the other big cities. Therefore, if the 
concentration in the SNCA is a big problem, then the same issue should be raised to 
the concentration elsewhere as well, which is not the case. It is not clear why only the 
concentration in the SNCA matters. This shows that the typical SNCA-non SNCA 
argument is not well-balanced and may be resorted frequently as such an argument 
can easily politicize the issue.4 
Moreover, according the new economic geography that we will discuss in detail 
 
 
<Table 3> Share of Major Cities 
(unit: %)  
 
Area Share Population Share Income Share 
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 
SNCA/Korea 11.8 11.8 11.8 45.2 46.2 48.1 47.7 47.8 47.3 
Daejeon/Chungchung 3.3 3.3 3.3 28.7 29.3 30.1 23.4 21.9 20.3 
Gwangju/Jeolla 2.4 2.4 2.4 24.1 25.8 28.2 21.3 21.6 21.4 
Daegu/Gyeongbuk 4.4 4.4 4.4 47.8 47.7 48.6 37.8 35.1 31.6 
(Busan+Ulsan)/Gyeongnam 6.1 14.7 14.8 49.8 61.1 60.0 36.8 62.2 61.6 
Data: Korea National Statistical Office Portal (http://www.kosis.go.kr). 
                                            
4Of course, these are no evidence that the current concentration in SNCA is not a problem, and that is 
not the purpose of the analysis, either. The discussion above is meant to suggest that the typical argument 
that highlights the concentration in the SNCA is problematic and not well-founded. 
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<Table 4> Ratio of Income and Population Share to Area Share (2005) 
 
 Population Share /Area Share 
Income Share 
/Area Share 
SNCA/Korea 4.08 4.01 
Daejeon/Chungchung 9.12 6.15 
Gwangju/Jeolla 11.75 8.92 
Daegu/Gyeongbuk 10.84 7.18 
(Busan+Ulsan)/Gyeongnam 4.05 4.16 
Data: Korea National Statistical Office Portal (http://www.kosis.go.kr). 
 
 
later, concentration or agglomeration arises naturally as a result of the development 
of transportation and market activity, and it is in itself not a pathology to fix. It is 
when agglomeration generates externalities or when the regional disparity is so high 
that it generates social problems that the government may need to intervene. 
However, the usual dichotomy argument seems to miss these points and lack 
scrupulous study on how to judge whether the current concentration is excessive or 
how to measure negative externalities. 
The argument that the degree of concentration in Korea is higher than those in 
other countries also seems faulty. The usual argument that compares the degree of 
concentration across countries does not mention the area share of the capital area of 
other countries. Recall that the population share of the capital area is 47.6% in Korea, 
32.6% in Japan, 18.7% in France, and 12.2% in the UK, which seemingly shows that 
concentration is very high in Korea. However, it should be noted that the capital area 
in Korea, Japan, France, and the UK respectively account for 11.8%, 3.5%, 2.2% and 
8.5% of the territory of each country. Therefore, one could argue that actually the 
degree of concentration is higher in Japan and France than in Korea. Anyhow, what 
is clear is that mere comparison of the population share without considering other 
factors may be quite misleading.5 
It should be also noted that the dichotomous framework of capital vs. non-capital 
area may miss the heterogeneity within the non-capital regions, and hence may 
result in unintended policy outcomes. Each non-capital region has different 
population and income, and treating all the non-capital regions as one unity is not 
reasonable; the disparity among the non-capital areas may be a more important issue. 
Also, the argument in the framework of capital vs. non-capital areas implicitly 
assumes that the SNCA enjoys a stronger economic power than other regions, but 
this is not supported by the data. Some industrialized regions like Ulsan and  
                                            
5Again, the purpose of this discussion is not to argue that concentration in the SNCA is not severe but 
rather to point out that the typical argument is problematic. Of course, different interpretations of the 
numbers above are possible. One could, for example, argue that the degree of concentration is much higher 
in Korea as the capital area accounts for almost half of the whole territory. 
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<Table 5> Decomposition of Gini Coefficient 
Region Gini index 
Korea 0.3954 
SNCA 0.3975 
Non-capital Area 0.3954 
Intra-Regional (SNCA – Non-capital) 0.3941 
Data: KLIPS(2006). 
Note: Gross household income was adjusted by the square-root of the number of family members. 
 
Gyeongnam-province actually have higher per capital GRDP than Seoul. This fact 
can be also seen by decomposing Gini coefficient and comparing the inter-regional 
(capital – noncapital area) Gini coefficient with national or regional Gini coefficients. 
As is evident from <Table 5>, which shows the decomposition of Gini coefficient of 
Korea, all the Gini coefficients are almost identical; if it were the case that SNCA is 
much richer than other regions, we should observe a very high intra-regional Gini 
coefficient. 
There are also arguments that assert that the overpopulation of the SNCA 
undermines national productivity and competitiveness. (PCBND [2004]) This claim, 
however, is not well-founded. It is only based on the mere observation that 
population of the SNCA and the national productivity moved in the same direction 
recently, and does not show any evidence that the latter is actually caused by the 
former. In fact, according to the analysis of Hahn and Shin (2007), the recent 
slowdown of the Korean economy is ascribable to diminishing inputs rather than to 
declining productivity. Choi et al. (2007) also find no relation between national 
competitiveness and regional disparity. Therefore, the claim that the overpopulation 
of the SNCA undermines the national productivity and competitiveness seems to 
lack theoretical and empirical basis at least at this stage. 
Most importantly, what the capital vs. non-capital areas argument seems to be 
missing fundamentally is the consideration about the right policy goal. The final goal 
of regional policy should address the individual or household welfare. However, 
how regional disparity or the gap between the capital and non-capital areas is related 
to the individual or household welfare is not clear. To begin with, non-capital areas 
cannot be treated as a unity due to heterogeneity. Also, poor people may reside in 
wealthy region and vice versa. Transferring income from a wealthy region to a poor 
region may end up making a poor person in a wealthy region subsidize a rich person 
in a poor region. If the income disparity is a problem, then the redistribution policy 
should target each individual or household, not region. 
 
 
2. Comparisons with the OECD Countries 
 
Comparisons of regional disparity across countries usually use as a measure the 
regional Gini index or variation coefficient. The OECD (2007) data enable us to go  
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[Figure 1] Population Concentration and Population Density (2003) 
 
y = -7.9051Ln(x) + 73.546
R2 = 0.4744
0
20
40
60
80
0 100 200 300 400 500
Korea
Population density (per km2)
Population Concentration
Netherlands
Australia
Iceland
Canada
 
Source: Koh et al. (2008). 
 
 
[Figure 2] GDP Concentration and Population Density (2003) 
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further. In this subsection, we present some of the analyses in Koh et al. (2008) based 
on the OECD (2007) and add a few more comparisons. 
To begin with, the concentration index of population and income in Korea is very 
high even after controlling for population density as [Figure 1] and [Figure 2] show. 
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[Figure 3] Regional Disparity and Per Capita GDP (2003) 
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Source: Koh et al. (2008). 
 
 
[Figure 4] Distribution of Regional Income (2003) 
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Source: Koh et al. (2008). 
 
 
In spite of the high concentration, however, disparity in income and other living 
standards do not seem very high. [Figure 3] shows the regional Gini index of each 
OECD country and finds that after controlling for population density the regional 
Gini index of Korea is only slightly higher than the average. In [Figure 4] which 
shows the income gap between the richest and the poorest region, Korea ranks just 
about the middle.  
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[Figure 5] Growth Rate of GRDP (1998~2003) 
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Source: Koh et al. (2008). 
 
 
[Figure 6] Distribution of Regional Unemployment Rate (2003) 
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Korea also enjoys a high regional growth rate with small disparity as [Figure 5] 
shows, and the unemployment rate in Korea, which is fairly low in absolute value, 
also shows small regional disparity as shown in [Figure 6]. 
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[Figure 7] Income Share of the Top 10% Regions 
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Data: OECD (2007). 
 
 
[Figure 8] Area Share of the Top 10% Regions in Income Concentration  
Area share of the 10% regions with the highest concentrationof GDP, 2003
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Data: OECD (2007). 
 
 
[Figure 7] shows the percent of national GDP in the top 10% regions when ranked 
by GRDP; it is found that the value in Korea, 36%, is almost the same as the OECD 
average, 36.7%. 
[Figure 8] shows the area share of the 10% regions with the highest concentration 
of GDP, and according to it this share is 7% in Korea and is just about the same as the 
OECD average, 6.85%. 
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[Figure 9] Income Level of the Top 10% Regions in Income Concentration 
 
GDP per capita (% of national GDP per capita) of the 10% of
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Data: OECD (2007). 
 
 
Finally, [Figure 9] shows the GDP per capita of the 10% of regions with the 
highest concentration of GDP in percentage of national GDP per capita. Korea 
records 106%, which is significantly smaller than the OECD average, 134%; this 
ranks fifth from the bottom. 
These comparisons suggest that in spite of the high concentration of population 
and income, 6 regional disparity in Korea is not very severe in various respects such 
as income, growth rate and unemployment compared with other OECD countries.7 
 
 
IV. Theoretical Studies on Regional Disparity 
 
 
There have been numerous economic studies on the pattern of regional disparity 
in a country as economy develops. Roughly, these studies can be broken down into 
                                            
6See PCBND (1994) for a more thorough account of the concentration in the SNCA. Kim (2008) analyzes 
the disparity between SNCA-non SNCA in various respects. 
7It should be made clear that the discussion in this section is not aimed at proposing that the 
concentration in the SNCA is not a problem. What the discussion tries to suggest instead is that i) 
concentration typically arises by market force and is in itself not something to cure unless it generates large 
scale externalities, that ii) it is hard to judge whether the current concentration is excessive or not, and that 
iii) in spite of the high concentration of population and income, the degree of regional disparity in Korea 
seems moderate in many respects among the OECD countries. 
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two distinct groups: one that suggests that regional disparity ultimately declines as 
economic development progresses and the other that suggests that regional disparity 
can be maintained and even expanded as economy develops. Neoclassical economics 
belongs to the former while cumulative causation model, core-periphery model, 
endogenous growth theory and new economic geography belong to the latter. In this 
section, we will briefly overview these theories to get insight into the regional policy 
in Korea. In particular, the new economic geography, the most recent development 
in spatial economics, has many theoretical advantages over previous models and 
merits detailed discussion. 
 
 
1. Convergence vs. Divergence 
 
Neoclassical growth theory assumes decreasing returns to scale and perfect 
mobility of inputs. These assumptions naturally lead to the conclusion that regional 
disparity gradually shrinks as economy develops and that eventually all the regional 
incomes are equalized (Borts and Stein (1964)). The marginal productivity of capital, 
for example, of a developed area declines and therefore capital moves to a less 
developed area where marginal productivity is higher. Similarly, labor moves to a 
less developed country where marginal productivity of labor and hence wage is 
higher. Through this process, all areas end up being equipped with the same level of 
inputs, and regional disparity disappears. In the neoclassical perspective, therefore, 
regional disparity is just an adjustment process toward equilibrium, and any 
prevailing disparity just suggests that there exist obstacles to perfect mobility of 
inputs. Barro (1991) shows that the growth rate of countries with lower per capita 
GDP is higher than those of higher per capita GDP countries. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991) also show using the US data that the same pattern holds within a country. 
However, there are other studies that report that income convergence is not well 
observed or occurs very slowly or that regional disparity actually widens 
( Dunford([1994], Armstrong (1994), and Magrini (1999)). 
Myrdal (1957) and Friedmann (1966) suggest, contrary to the neoclassical growth 
theory, that income convergence cannot occur due to structural reasons and that 
regional disparity may actually widen. Myrdal (1957) models the economic growth 
of a region as a process of cumulative causation. An event such as the discovery of a 
mineral resource triggers the development of a region. Then the marginal 
productivity of capital and wage rises due to the increasing returns to scale. 
Moreover, the government may assign more resources to the developed region to 
take advantage of its efficiency when allocating resources across regions to maximize 
national growth. Overall, initial factors, market force, and government policy 
cumulatively work toward income divergence. Friedmann (1966) goes one step 
further and argues in his core-periphery model that not only economic but also 
political and institutional factors cause and consolidate regional gap. 
Endogenous growth theory, put forward by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), notes 
the importance of technological development and human capital and also suggests 
that regional disparity is likely to be maintained and expanded as economy develops. 
According to this theory, technological development and human capital, which are 
 Reconsidering the Goal and Strategy of Regional Development Policy in Korea   87 
 
essential to economic growth, exhibit increasing returns to scale through externalities. 
More human capital flows into a region where there already exist enough human 
capital to take advantage of the positive externality, and this inflow accelerates the 
creation of knowledge, which in turn draws more human capital and so on. This 
process of cumulative causality implies that regional disparity is likely to expand as 
economy develops since economic development typically occurs centering around a 
region where knowledge and technology are actively created with high stock of 
human capital. 
 
 
2. New Economic Geography 
 
The new economic geography (NEG), which was initiated by Krugman (1991), is 
a branch of spatial economics that aims to explain the formation of economic 
agglomeration in geographical space.8 NEG improves on the past research on the 
spatial distribution of economic activity in many respects. It adopts micro-founded 
mechanism and general equilibrium framework to analyze the geographical 
agglomeration of economic activity. It also formally models such important factors as 
pecuniary externality, self-reinforcing mechanism and forward/backward linkages. 
It also takes an evolutionary approach to the creation and buildup of core areas. In 
short, NEG can be regarded as the state-of-the-art economic research that is actively 
producing convincing results. Taking the importance of NEG into account, we 
briefly overview its key idea and seek to draw implications for the regional 
development policy. 
 
2.1. Key Idea of the New Economic Geography 
 
According to the analysis of NEG, agglomeration occurs through pecuniary 
externality, and regional disparity may deepen further because of increasing returns 
to scale. This is in contrast with the prediction of neoclassical economics, according 
to which regional disparity will eventually dissolve due to the adjustment of input 
prices. In addition, NEG asserts, agglomeration of economic activity occurs and 
maintains itself through self-reinforcing mechanism rather than by comparative 
advantage. Overall, the discussion of NEG takes a pessimistic view of balanced 
regional development. To see this in more detail, we briefly overview the 
development in NEG. 
The basic framework of NEG is well illustrated in the core-periphery model in 
Krugman (1991), which shows how the interactions among transport costs, factor 
mobility and increasing returns can result in agglomeration. The main idea is as 
follows. When the transport costs are very high, firms will locate near the market to 
save transport costs. As the transport costs go down, the incentive to locate near the 
market gets smaller and the incentive for firms to gather and enjoy increasing returns 
to scale gets bigger. This agglomeration of firms boosts the demand for labor and 
hence the wage rate will rise. This will attract workers, which in turn will attract 
                                            
8See Fujita and Mori (2005) for a detailed survey of NEG. 
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more firms. That is, agglomeration is strengthened by self-reinforcing process. 
Agglomeration effect occurs through many channels. In the labor market, firms 
can easily find workers and workers can easily find a job as the labor market 
expands. In the production sector, producers of final goods and intermediate goods 
gather together, which facilitates specialization. Also, firms can enjoy economies of 
scale by producing in bulk. The SOC utilized jointly by the firms contributes to 
reducing production cost. Exchange of knowledge due to agglomeration also 
facilitates the creation and accumulation of knowledge. As for consumption, 
agglomeration creates various markets that meet consumers’ demand, and this 
attracts more people to the core. Hence the population inflow from the periphery 
into the core occurs. 
According to the above argument, regional disparity may deepen as 
agglomeration progresses. This phenomenon is mostly market-driven, and it is not 
necessarily undesirable even from the perspective of equity as will be discussed later. 
NEG also implies that government’s effort to disperse agglomeration may result 
in an unintended outcome. Venables (1996) in particular shows that weakening a 
location’s industrial base makes the location less attractive and beyond some critical 
point may lead to complete deindustrialization of the location unless the 
disadvantage of a small industrial base is offset by a sufficiently low wage. 
NEG also studies the effect of agglomeration on growth. Noting that the disparity 
in growth rate across countries is diminishing but at the same time the intra-national 
regional disparity is widening in Europe, Martin (1998) shows theoretically and 
empirically that regional policy may generate unintended outcomes. He shows that 
supporting low income areas can be hardly effective and investment in infrastructure 
that reduces transport cost may induce firms in poor areas to relocate to high income 
areas, which will impoverish underdeveloped regions even further. He analyzes the 
European data and finds that investment in infrastructure hardly benefits poor areas 
although it often benefits developed areas. This study hence shows that regional 
policy of this fashion may be problematic not only from the viewpoint of efficiency 
but also from the viewpoint of equity. This study also shows that there may exist a 
tradeoff between growth rate and regional convergence. 
Martin and Ottaviano (1999, 2001) combine endogenous growth with 
endogenous industry location, and study their interaction. They show that the 
reduction in transaction cost due to economic integration induces firms to locate 
where R&D takes place, and this increases the growth rate there. Importantly, this 
study shows that increase in technological innovation through spatial agglomeration 
may benefit the periphery area as well; if the transaction cost is low enough and the 
effect of innovation through agglomeration is big enough, poor regions may benefit. 
Fujita and Thisse (2003) also come to a similar conclusion with respect to welfare. 
They show that if the technological innovation through agglomeration brings in high 
growth, agglomeration can benefit every region even without any inter-regional 
income transfer. However, this may widen inter-regional gap in absolute income if 
the core region grows by more. In this sense, growth through agglomeration may be 
regressive, and the effect of growth on equity crucially depends on the objective 
function or social welfare function. 
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2.2. Implications for Regional Policy9 
 
One of the main messages of NEG is that spatial agglomeration is a natural 
phenomenon that arises through the interaction of many economic activities; 
agglomeration arises and reinforces itself through self-reinforcing mechanism when 
factors of production is mobile and there exist transport cost and increasing returns. 
The first implication from this is that any effort to disperse agglomeration is 
unlikely to be very successful. It is the natural functioning of market that generates 
agglomeration and, regardless of whether to regard it as a ‘market failure’ or an 
efficient outcome by the ‘invisible hand,’ it is obvious that it will be hard to work 
against the market forces. 
More specifically, suppose the government intends to relocate firms from the core 
to peripheries using a policy that affects firms’ location decision. For such a policy to 
succeed, firms should be provided with incentives that exceed the current advantage 
of staying in the core. This means that a policy limited in magnitude can hardly be 
effective and that the cost of executing an effective policy will be high. If the final 
goal of the government is the autonomous development of peripheries and not the 
dispersion of agglomeration itself, significant number of firms should relocate, and 
this means that the cost will be huge. This will naturally give rise to questioning the 
effect of such a policy for the cost; if cost exceeds benefit, the policy will not be 
validated. 
What is more important in this regard is that even if the policy somehow 
disperses agglomeration of the core successfully, the intended policy goal may not be 
achieved. If the benefit from agglomeration and resultant growth occur only above a 
certain level and magnitude of agglomeration, decentralization may fail to bring 
about the development of peripheries if it ends up with two agglomerations below 
the critical level. Moreover, even when the peripheries benefit from decentralization, 
decentralization may harm national growth if the benefit of peripheries is smaller 
than the loss the core incurs. The study of Venables (1996) which shows that 
decentralization may result in complete decentralization of the core shows an 
extreme possibility of such a case. 
Incidentally, this argument also suggests that the government’s effort to induce 
an industry to be concentrated in a specific region doesn’t seem promising (Kim 
[2003]); firms will not relocate unless the government’s intervention generates 
enough linkage effects for agglomeration to form. Taking advantage of the spillover 
effect from agglomeration may be more effective for the development of 
underdeveloped areas. 
However, the argument of NEG is not necessarily in conflict with the 
government’s effort to seek for balanced regional development. On the contrary, 
NEG may provide a rationale for balanced development if it is the case that 
agglomeration, which arises by the market forces, generates externality and the 
socially optimal level of agglomeration is actually much smaller. According to this 
                                            
9The discussion below is based on the author’s judgement that NEG well captures the economic realityl 
and hence is useful in drawing policy implications. Disagreement may well exist on the choice and 
judgement. 
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view, agglomeration causes overpopulation, increases pollution and transport cost 
and impoverishes peripheries. In short, agglomeration is a market failure and the 
government should come in to fix it. Theoretically, this argument makes sense as 
well and hence a close examination is necessary to evaluate it. 
To begin with, it is very hard at least theoretically to judge whether the current 
level of agglomeration is socially excessive or not. (Kim [2003]) The opposite 
assertion can be also made that the current agglomeration is actually too small 
because firms do not take into account the social benefit of agglomeration. 
The argument that agglomeration impoverishes other regions also needs to be 
checked closely. The absolute income level of peripheries may decrease in the 
beginning stage of concentration, but eventually the growth of the core may benefit 
peripheries as suggested by Martin and Ottaviano (1999, 2001) and Fujita and Thisse 
(2003). The absolute gap between the core and peripheries may widen even when the 
income of the core and peripheries both increase; this will be the case when the 
increase in income is higher in the core than in the peripheries. The effect of 
core-driven growth on regional inequality in terms of the Gini index is not clear; it 
depends on the specific pattern of growth. If, for example, the core-driven growth 
raises the income share of the peripheries, the Gini index will go down, suggesting 
an improvement of regional disparity. If it raises the income share of the core, which 
is more realistic, then the Gini index will go up.  Even in this case, however, it is not 
obvious whether it should be interpreted as an indication of worsening inequality; it 
is true that the Gini index is higher, but now the peripheries are better off than before. 
We actually need a criterion for judgement, or social welfare function, to be able to 
answer such a question. To summarize, the statement that agglomeration deepens 
regional disparity can hold only limitedly, and we really need to establish an agreed 
criterion for judgement to reach a definite conclusion. 
 
 
V. Directions for Future Policies 
 
 
1. Evaluation of the Past Policies 
 
There have been many regional development polices since the 1970’s, an era of 
fast growth. One important aspect that is found consistently in these policies is that 
they all aimed at regional equity; regional development policy implicitly or explicitly 
meant balanced regional development policy in Korea. Regional disparity was 
discussed in the framework of capital vs. non-capital area, and many measures were 
taken to reduce the gap. Such measures include constructing SOC in 
underdeveloped regions, providing incentives for firms in the SNCA to relocate to 
non-capital regions, building up and subsidizing industry bases in underdeveloped 
regions, controlling the expansion of the SNCA, and so on. 
It is hard to evaluate the efficacy of such policies, but judging from the fact that 
questions are still being raised about the gap between the capital and non-capital 
areas, it seems hard to conclude that such policies were successful. 
More importantly, recent development in spatial economics and experiences in 
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other countries suggest in common that regional equity may be a wrong target. As 
discussed in the previous section, NEG shows that agglomeration is market-driven 
and dissolving it will be hard. Moreover, as the growth through agglomeration may 
eventually benefit peripheries, seeking for regional equity by dispersing 
agglomeration may be harmful. The turn in the direction of regional policies in other 
countries also give similar implications. Countries like France sought for regional 
equity by decentralizing and transferring income to ease off concentration in Paris in 
the past. However, in the changing environment of industry restructuring, 
globalization, knowledge-based economy and competition, they changed the 
direction of regional policy and began to focus on the competitiveness of the capital 
area, growth potential of the nation and international competitiveness. They also 
turn to decentralization for regional autonomous growth. Such a trend implies much 
for the direction of regional polices in Korea that is in the similar environment. 
The Balanced National Development Policy (BNDP) in Roh administration which 
explicitly pursued regional equity merits a more thorough discussion. As discussed 
in Section 2, BNDP stands out among various regional policies in many respects. It 
took a comprehensive approach and used many systematic apparatuses, streamlined 
the process of regional projects and emphasized the autonomous development of 
regions. 
Some critics of BNDP point out that in practice the role of local governments was 
subsidiary contrary to the spirit of BNDP and little progress was made to foster 
regional autonomy. Such criticism may be relevant, but problems of those kinds 
seem to be inevitable to some extent since BNDP was only at the beginning stage and 
the capability of local government is still weak. A more fundamental question has to 
do with the viewpoint and approach taken by BNDP. 
First of all, BNDP regards the gap between the capital and non-capital area as a 
pathology that should be cured to strengthen national competitiveness. However, as 
discussed in detail in Section 3, the framework of capital vs. non-capital area is 
problematic and may cause distributional unfairness as well as loss of economic 
efficiency. 
Moreover, some of goals of BNDP seem incompatible with each other. BNDP 
defines balanced regional development as “improving the quality of life, pursuing 
sustainable growth and reinforcing national competitiveness by facilitating regional 
equity and promoting regional development capability.” However, it is generally 
agreed that balanced development is in conflict with national competitiveness; 
balanced development usually comes at a cost of efficiency loss. 
Besides, one may question the feasibility of balanced development itself. BNDP 
seeks to promote the potential of all the regions and hence maximize national 
competitiveness. However, promoting the potential of all the regions may be 
infeasible. It is international competitiveness, not domestic competitiveness, that is 
necessary in the globalized world, and promoting the potential of all the regions 
seems to ignore comparative advantage argument or cost-benefit analysis-type of 
consideration. 
BNDP may also overlap with other existing policies. The core of BNDP is to raise 
the income of underdeveloped regions. However, there already exist policies that 
support poor individuals or households, and how BNDP relates to those policies is 
92    韓國開發硏究 / 2010. Ⅰ  
 
 
not established well. 
Finally and very importantly, one may question whether BNDP is a timely policy 
at this point of time. Koh et al. (2008) argue that the national agenda that should be 
given priority to is to boost up growth and improve income distribution. As 
balanced development is likely to conflict with both of the two, they argue, it is not 
desirable for balanced development to take priority. Considering the recent 
slowdown in growth and aggravating income distribution, this assertion seems quite 
persuasive. 
To sum up, BNDP has many aspects that improve on the past polices but at the 
same time still suffer from some problems shared by the past policies. It is of utmost 
importance that we learn our lesson from the past policies and use it constructively 
in designing future policy. 
 
 
2. Goal and Strategy of the Future Regional Development Policy 
 
As is evident from the discussion so far, regional development is a very complex 
subject in which various factors are entangled with each other. Thus, it would be too 
ambitious to try to establish the goal and strategy of regional development policy 
from the general and somewhat abstract discussion so far. Nonetheless, it will be still 
meaningful to put the discussion so far together and attempt to seek for the goal and 
strategy of regional policy, be it somewhat vague and abstract. 
The first thing to point out is that the paradigm of regional development policy 
should depart from focusing on promoting regional disparity. Attempts to raise 
regional equity is likely to come into conflict with growth or national 
competitiveness, and may also have a negative effect on distribution contrary to the 
intended plan. The negative effect on distribution may occur because raising regional 
equity may ignore intra-regional heterogeneity and hence violate vertical and 
horizontal equity. If, for example, the government transfers income from SNCA to a 
rural area with a lower regional income, this may result in having the poor in SNCA 
assist the rich in the poor region, which violates vertical equity. Moreover, under 
such an income transfer scheme, a person in a poor region may fare better than a 
person in a rich region although the two persons have the same income; this violates 
horizontal equity. In this sense, regional disparity cannot be treated as individual 
income inequality, as a region is a collection of heterogeneous residents and regional 
income only reflects the average of individual income. 
As for methodology, recent studies and experiences in other countries imply that 
raising regional equity by relocating the resources in the core region to peripheries is 
not only hard to succeed but may result in unintended outcome. Of course, support 
for underdeveloped regions should be maintained. But the purpose of such a policy 
should be to guarantee a certain level of living conditions or national minimum 
everywhere, not to reduce the absolute gap among regions. 
In this regard, regional development plan should be carried out in two directions. 
One is to provide public goods or merit goods to guarantee a certain level of living 
conditions everywhere. Of course such a policy need not belong to the category of 
regional development policy. For example, the existing inter-governmental grant 
 Reconsidering the Goal and Strategy of Regional Development Policy in Korea   93 
 
system is already playing a role in inter-regional redistribution in part, and hence the 
above policy may be included in this category. 
The other is to focus on maximizing the growth potential of each region and 
promote regional innovation capacity for autonomous growth. This seems to be the 
most crucial element in designing future regional development policy. The current 
system in which the central government takes the lead in carrying out regional 
projects is bound to result in negative side effects; local demand is not represented 
well and local governments are preoccupied in getting grants from the central 
government instead of working on reinforcing autonomous capability. To solve 
these problems, local governments should be eventually responsible for regional 
development so that they hold accountability and the sense of ownership. That is, 
each region should reinforce its capacity and find an engine for autonomous growth 
to build up its own income base. The role of the central government should be 
limited to coordinating and monitoring regional projects ex ante, and evaluating the 
result ex post. Of course, the central government should provide necessary assistance 
when local governments lack initial resources or impetus. Such division of roles 
between the central and local governments is essential and should be established 
firmly. 
However, reinforcing the accountability of regions by such division of roles 
presupposes an important change. Local governments should be endowed with 
sufficient autonomy, in particular funds to finance regional projects. Without this, 
solid regional capacity is hard to achieve since local governments will spend most of 
the time and resources to attract grants from the central government. 
To sum up, local governments should be held responsible for regional 
development, and at the same time be given necessary autonomy and means. The 
central government should coordinate, evaluate and foster regional projects instead 
of taking initiatives. 
 
 
VI. Concluding Remark 
 
 
This paper puts forward some policy suggestions regarding the goal and 
strategies of the regional development policy in Korea. We first find that although 
population and income are highly concentrated, inequalities of income and other 
living standards do not seem as problematic as to call for strong government 
intervention. Moreover, recent development in economics suggests that the ‘capital 
vs. non-capital area’ framework that has been shaping the Korean regional 
development policy should be reconsidered. The main message of this paper is that 
it is not desirable for the central government to disperse agglomeration to enhance 
regional equity, and that the regional government should be responsible for regional 
development; therefore enhancing the autonomy and accountability of the regional 
government is essential. 
Finding the growth engine for autonomous regional development by raising 
autonomy and accountability of the local governments seems essential for 
sustainable growth and national competitiveness in a globalized world where the 
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share of knowledge-based industry is increasing. Efforts should be made to find the 
specific strategies to achieve this goal in the long term view, and it should be avoided 
that a premature policy is enacted or policy direction frequently changes regime by 
regime. 
Admittedly, the policy suggestion made in this paper is somewhat too general 
and abstract, lacking specific and concrete strategies. Still, it is very important to 
view the big picture and try to get a perspective, be it abstract or vague. This paper 
should be regarded as one of such attempts. More studies on this important subject 
should follow in the future. 
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